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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CRANE CO., a corporation, 
Plaintiff amd Appellant, 
-vs.-
UTAH MOTOR PARK, 
INCORPORATED, 
a corporation, 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts set forth by appellant is 
substantially correct, but we feel that the issues raised 
by the Answer should be stated and one or two additional 
facts shown. 
Defendant, in paragraph 2 of its Answer (R3) de-
nied that it entered into a contract with Walsh for the 
construction, addition or repair of a building or build-
ings as alleged in paragraph IV of the Complaint (Rl); 
but on the other hand alleged its transaction with Walsh 
was for the purchase of a boiler which had theretofore 
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been sold to Walsh by the plaintiff (Crane). Defendant 
also denied that. plaintiff (Crane) furnished the boiler to 
defenda;n.t at the insta;n.ce of Walsh, as alleged in para-
graph VI of the Complaint (R2), but on the other hand 
alleged in paragraph 4 of the Answer that the boiler was 
sold to defenda;n.t by Walsh, the then owner thereof with 
full right to sell the same. 
There were other defenses alleged but the pre-trial 
hearing had not proceeded to a consideration of those 
matters, and, of course, no trial was had because, upon 
presentation of the invoice (Exhibit 1) the trial court 
held that plaintiff had by its own evidence failed to es-
tablish a case, and had in fact established the defense 
alleged by defendant. 
Counsel states, which is a fact, that plaintiff (Crane) 
recommended to defendant that it purchase the boiler 
from Wa.lsh. Plaintiff (Crane Co.) also expressly 
directed how the transaction had to be handled; viz., as 
a sale by it (Crane) to Walsh and as a re-sale by Walsh 
to defendant (R8, 9). 
Also, as a part of the pre-trial hearing it was ex-
pressly admitted by plaintiff (Crane Co.) that prior to 
sale of the boiler to defendant it (Crane) passed title to 
Walsh (R6). We quote from the record: 
"THE CouRT: I think that ends the lawsuit. 
I think the document itself shows that it was a sale 
to Walsh and that the company having parted with 
their title would not be able to follow it past the 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR. RicH: That's what the sales act says too. 
THE CouRT : Yes. 
MR. BoYER: I don't think there is any ques-
tion about that, but we can't follow - that we 
passed the title, and it went into your place. There 
is no question about that. The same thing would 
be true in every case where you have got a me-
chanic's lien. The title passes to the stuff that 
goes into the place, to the plumber, to the work-
man or whoever the man is, the mechanic who is 
doing the job. 
THE CouRT: You have to sell at retail to do 
that, don't you 1 
MR. BoYER: I don't think so. 
THE CouRT: There has to be a sales tax col-
lected on it. 
(Discussion) 
MR. RicH: I move to dismiss the case, for 
summary judgment.'' 
Thereupon, the motion to dismiss and for summary 
judgment was granted. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The Court properly dismissed Plaintiff's com-
plaint because : 
(a) Plaintiff's evidence showed Walsh Plumbing 
Company, from whom defendant purchased the boiler, to 
be a retailer, not a contractor; and 
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(b) Plaintiff's evidence showed that at the time the 
boiler was acquired by defendant, plaintiff had parted 
with title; hence could not have been the one that fur-
nished it to defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
(a) PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE SHOWED 
WALSH PLUMBING COMPANY, FROM WHOM DE-
FENDANT PURCHASED THE BOILER, TO BE A 
RETAII_JER, NOT A CONTRACTOR. 
It was the decision of the trial court, and we re-
spectfully submit that it is sound law, that the statute in 
question here was intended to cover the relationship of 
contractor and materialman, not the relationship of 
wholesaler and retailer, as evidenced in this case by the 
endorsement on the invoice. 
Utah has three statutes, all somewhat related, for 
the protection of materialmen who furnish materials to 
contractors, to be included in the owner's property pur-
suant to a contract for the erection or repair of a build-
ing. They are: The Mechanics Lien Law, Title 38, Chap-
ter 1; the law relating to Public Contracts, Title 14, Chap-
ter 1; and the law relating to Private Contracts, Title 14, 
Chapter 2. In Hach and all of those laws the basic rela-
tionship that has to be established to come within the 
benefits of the protective provisions of the law, is that of 
contractor and materialman. 
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Those statutes were never intended to, and do not 
cover other types of relationships pertaining to the han-
dling and sale of personal property. 
Building materials, heating and air-conditioning 
equipment, lighting equipment, roofing, paint, doors, 
awnings, windows, hot water tanks, boilers, bricks, ma-
chinery, wallpaper and all types of fixtures may, when 
included within the purview of a building contract, be-
come lienable items when furnished to a contractor by a 
materialman. But the same type of equipment may also 
be purchased at retail from any of the many retailers 
handling those items. We have no doubt the members of 
this Court will take judicial notice of the fact that lumber, 
doors, windows, cement and all types of building mate-
rials may be purchased at retail direct from the lumber 
yards and mills; and that all types of appliances and 
equipment may be purchased at retail in Z. C. M. I., Sears, 
and any one of the many retail stores handling he a ti:Jlg 
equipment, appliances, and other types of "ready-for-
installation'' improvements for the home or farm. 
Had it been intended by the Legislature that persons 
purchasing materials and equipment at retail from a 
retailer had to take out a bond to protect the wholesaler 
or jobber and other middlemen in the chain of title back 
to the manufacturer, it would have so stated in clear 
language; and it would also have provided for the 
retailer to give a sworn affidavit to the purchaser setting 
forth the name of the wholesaler or jobber from whom 
it was originally purchased, together with a statement 
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showing the status of its account with the wholesaler. 
The ridiculous situation thus resulting from an attempt 
to apply this law to a retailer-wholesaler relationship is 
evident. 
A contractor-materialman relationship stands on an 
entirely different basis. In that relationship the material-
man. is the retailer and the· contractor is the user or con-
sumer, as the sales tax law clearly states. 
It is no longer an open question in this State as to 
the status of the contractor as the consumer, so far as 
the sales tax is concerned. It was thoroughly discussed 
and decided in Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State 
Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 Pac. 2d 408. It was 
unanimously held that the contractor is the user or con-
sumer not a retailer, as shown in Exhibit 1. The Supreme 
·Court o:f Arizona, citing the above Utah case as authority, 
gave the unanswerable reason for the rule in Duhame v. 
State Taa; Com.mission, 179 Pac. 2d 252, in the follow-
ing language : 
"* * * While perhaps a contractor may be making 
a sale in the loose sense of the word, and while, 
in that loose sense it might also be a sale at retail, 
he is certainly not making a sale at retail of tan-
gible personal property which is the necessary 
meaning of the term 'sale' when used in this Act. 
By the definitions in this Act a contractor 'vhen 
fabricating personalty into realty neither sells, 
resells, sells at retail, nor can he be considered a 
retailer.'' 
If, therefore, Walsh had been a contractor for de-
fendant, as plaintiff now alleges in paragraphs IV and VI 
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of the complaint in an attempt to bring this transaction 
within the scope of this law, the plaintiff (Crane Co.) 
would have been liable to the State of Utah for sales tax 
on the transaction. If, on the other hand, the transac-
tion was, as found by the trial court, and as shown by 
the invoice (Exhibit 1), a wholesaler-retailer transac-
tion, then Walsh was a retailer, not a contractor, and 
Crane Company was a wholesaler selling to a retaile.r, 
not a materialman selling to a contractor. 
The stamped endorsement on the invoice is the statu-
tory form outlined in Sec. 59-15-2 (c) and (d) for identi-
fication of the wholesaler-retailer relationship. 
A contractor is defined by our statute ( 58-6-3) as one 
who for a fee undertakes to construct, alter or repair 
buildings, etc. The fee represents the skill, responsibility 
and integrity of the contractor in producing the final 
result, and is the pay of the contractor for services ren-
dered. On the other hand, a retailer sells for a given sales 
price and the difference between the sales price and the 
cost is profit- not a fee for services. 
Counsel quotes from two Utah cases: Liberty Coal 
and Lumber Co. v. Snow, 53 Utah 298, 178 Pac. 341, and 
Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 Pac. 
241. We have no quarrel with the law announced in those 
cases. In each of them the contractor relationship to the 
owner was undisputed - in fact admitted. The cases had 
to do with other points of law. If, on the other hand, 
Mr. Darke and Mr. Snow had purchased the materials 
from Rio Grande Lumber Co., and Liberty Coal & Lum-
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her Co., respectively, at retail, and paid for it to the 
retailer, and then some wholesaler, jobber or manufac-
turer had tried to sue them for failure to get a bond from 
Rio Grande Lumber and Liberty Coal Co., as retailers, 
the result would, we are confident, have been different. 
The status of this transaction was determined as of 
the time when it occurred, when Crane Co. stamped the 
invoice and made the sale. It cannot now be switched 
back to suit the advantage of Crane Co. 
Crane Company is a distributor of builders' hard-
ware and appliances. Many sales by it are undoubtedly 
made to retailers. It also, undoubtedly, makes sales in 
substantial volume to contractors for incorporation into 
building projects. On sales to retailers Crane Company 
pays no sales tax, passes title to the retailer and the 
retailer has any lien right that may exist as materialman. 
On sales to contractors, Crane Company is a retailer, 
pays the sales tax to the State as a retailer under our 
law, and in that case Crane Company has the lien right 
as materialman. In the case at bar Crane Company chose 
to be a wholesaler and not a materialman. 
Having taken the position at the time of sale that 
Walsh was a. reta;iler making a sale of personal property 
to defendant, "Te respectfully submit that the trial court 
was correct in its decision that such status controls now 
and destroys this cause of action. 
(b) PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT 
AT THE TIME THE BOILER WAS ACQUIRED BY 
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DEFENDANT, PLAINTIFF HAD PARTED WITH 
TITLE; HENCE COUL·D NOT HAVE BEEN THE 
ONE THAT FURNISHED IT TO DEFENDANT. 
Under the Sales Act, Sec. 60-2-3 (Rule 1) the title to 
personal property sold by a wholesaler to a retailer for 
resale passes to the retailer when the contract is made. 
The attorney for plaintiff did not dispute this. In 
fact, he admitted it (R. 6). If title passed to Walsh, then 
Walsh was the one that would have the right to protec-
tion as materialman, as otvner of the property, under 
whatever laws, statutes, or agreement as might be in-
volved for its protection. Walsh was the third party of 
whom this court was speaking in the Liberty Coal case. 
This very question was before the California Court 
in Harris & Stunston, Inc. v. Yorba Linda Citrus Ass'n, 
26 Pac. 2d 654. California has incorporated its Mechan-
ic's Lien Laws into one composite law, but, as stated by 
this court in Rio Grarnde Lumber Co. v. Da.rke, supra, 
cited by appellant, its essential features are the same as 
our statutes. In the Harris case, above, the plaintiff, a 
wholesaler, had sold some water softeners to one W. F. 
Cruller, a plumber, who in turn sold them to the named 
defendant. Plaintiff, the wholesaler, then filed a lien 
against defendant's property and tried to take the posi-
tion that it, the wholesaler, was a materialman and that 
Cruller, the retailer, was a contractor- exactly the thing 
the Crane Company is trying to do in this case. The trial 
court found that Cruller was a seller, not a contractor, 
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and the wholesaler appealed. We quote from the decision 
sustaining the trial court as follows : 
"The appellant contends that one W. F. 
Cruller was a subcontractor employed to do 
plumbing and similar work on the buildings in 
question; that he was the statutory agent of the 
respondent within the meaning of section 1183 
of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that it fur-
nished these softeners to Cruller as such agent. It 
is respondent's contention that Cruller, in furnish-
ing the water softeners, was not a subcontractor 
but was himself a materialman. The court found 
that Cruller sold the water softeners to the re-
spondent at an agreed price and installed them 
upon the property; that the water softeners when 
sold to the respondent were the property of 
Cruller ; that the respondent paid Cruller in full; 
that nothing was due to the appellant on account 
of said water softeners ; and that the respondent 
was not entitled to a lien. It was further found 
that the appellant, through its authorized agents, 
induced and requested the respondent to purchase 
these water softeners from Cruller; that in re-
liance upon this the respondent in good faith pur-
chased the same from Cruller; and that Crul-
ler acted as a materialman in selling the machines 
to the respondent. 
* * * * * 
''Cruller testified that he was in the whole-
sale plumbing and heating business; that he main-
tained a store ; that among other things, he han-
dled water softeners; that he sold these softeners 
to the respondent and installed them ; that he 
bought them from the appellant and sold them to 
the respondent; that the appellant billed him for 
them and he billed them to the respondent; that 
the respondent had paid him in full; that he was 
later forced into bankruptcy; that he had had sim-
10 
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ilar water softeners on display in his store for 
seven or ten years before this time; that he had 
previously bought 'vater softeners from the ap-
pellant and sold them to other parties ; that this 
deal was handled in all respects similar to prior 
transactions except that these softeners were 
shipped direct to the respondent's place of busi-
ness instead of being sent to his store and then 
reshipped; and that in all other cases the appel-
lant had not attempted to collect direct from his 
customers. It appears that the water softeners 
were sold by Cruller to the respondent at an 
agreed price and that an additional amount was 
paid for their installation. While the latter 
amount does not appear, the evidence indicates 
that it was only a. fraction of the purchase price. 
''We think this evidence supports the findings 
and conclusions of the trial court and that the 
same may not be disturbed. It seems clear that 
this case belongs to that class where a finished 
article is sold, the installation thereof being mere-
ly incidental and a. part of the deli very. Under 
such circumstances the trial court correctly held 
that Cruller was a materialman and not a sub-
contractor acting as the agent of the owner.'' (Em-
phasis added) 
We respectfully submit that under the undisputed 
evidence in this case as shown by the plaintiff's invoice 
presented at the pre-trial conference, the trial court cor-
rectly ruled that plaintiff was not a materialman, but 
was a wholesaler, and that Walsh was not a contractor but 
a retailer, and that defendant was not liable to plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH, EL.TON & MANGUM 
And H. WRIGHT VOL,KER 
Attorneys for Defen.dG!Yd 
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